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CONTRACTS NOT TO REVOKE JOINT OR MUTUAL
WILLS: INDIANA'S INCONSISTENT STANDARD
FOR DETERMINING TESTATOR INTENT
A common situation confronting the estate planner is one where
a husband and wife execute their wills at the same time. It is not
uncommon for these parties to desire, when executing their wills, to
dispose of all of their property whether owned jointly or in severalty
according to a common plan. This plan usually provides for the sur-
viving spouse to receive an interest in all or most of the property
owned by the deceased spouse and also provides for the disposition
of the remaining interest in that property.' The use of joint or
mutual wills2 is a method often used by estate planners when co-
ordinating the disposition of marital estates in situations such as
these.'
The use of joint or mutual wills is not an uncriticized practice."
Further, many state courts are perplexed when confronted with
1. These interests are commonly in the form of a fee simple or life estate.
See generally SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 105-109 (1956), which discusses the
nature of the relationship between the promisor and promisee in a contractual will
[hereinafter cited as SPARKS].
2. The courts and commentators are not uniform in defining "joint" or
"mutual" wills. For the purpose of this note the following generally accepted defini-
tions will be used.
A joint will is a single testamentary instrument which provides for the
testamentary plan of two or more testators. It must be executed concurrently by the
testators and may dispose of property owned jointly or in severalty. Although the
term joint will uses the singular form of the noun, two testamentary schemes are ac-
tually created. The joint will must be fully and independently probated upon the death
of each testator. 1 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS § 11.1 (1960).
Mutual wills are the separate wills of two or more testators which are
reciprocal, identical or substantially similar in their provisions or which on their face,
when considered together, show that the instruments are one integrated plan of
disposition. Reciprocal provisions are those provisions in separate wills which are iden-
tical except that the testator and beneficiary are reversed. Id.
Sometimes a joint will is referred to as "joint and mutual" will. Professor Page
states: "It is improper to speak of an instrument as being a 'joint and mutual' will, for
it can only be one or the other and not both." Further, while some courts and commen-
tators refer to any separate wills executed at the same time as "mutual," Professor
Page states that only wills with reciprocal provisions should be called "mutual." Id.
3. See Note, Joint or Mutual Wills, 61 HARV. L. REV. 675 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as Joint or Mutual Wills].
4. Several writers have discouraged the use of joint or mutual wills. See
Blank, Problem Areas in Will Drafting Under New York Law, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
459, 483 (1982) ("Clearly, however, joint and reciprocal wills create more trouble than
they are worth, and unless the practitioner has a compelling reason for using such
wills, he should not do so."); Cook, The Contractual WilL Invitation to Litigation and
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these instruments and express conflicting views as to the nature of
the obligation these instruments create and their irrevocability.'
These conflicting views and the general criticism directed at the use
of joint or mutual wills leads to questions of whether these testa-
mentary instruments are legitimate and effective probate tools.'
Despite strong criticism, attorneys have and will continue to draft
joint or mutual wills for their clients.'
Excess Taxation, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 909, 911 (1970) ("There may be ... no satisfactory
solution to the problem of inflexibility other than to avoid the use of contractual wills
altogether."); see generally Note, Wills: Problems Presented by the Use of Conjoint
Wills, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 454 (1972); see Joint or Mutual Wills, supra note 3, at 675.
Further, the use of joint wills has been criticized when the use of mutual wills
could accomplish the same goals. See 1 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS § 11.1 (1960)
("The use of a joint will is not advised, for there is a greater likelihood that pitfalls of
execution and draftsmanship will arise."); see Falender, Decedent's Estates and
Trusts, 1981 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 15 IND. L. REV. 1 (1981).
5. See Joint or Mutual Wills, supra note 3, at 675. See, e.g., Frazier v. Pat-
terson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909) where the court stated:
If two persons make wills, each devising his property to the other, there
is no necessary inference that the wills were the result of any mutual or
reciprocal agreement or understanding. Such wills might be executed
without either party knowing that the other had executed his will; but,
where the parties execute their wills by the same instrument, it is not
possible that such course could be adopted without some previous under-
standing or agreement between them.
Id. at 86, 90 N.E. at 218. But see Meake v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, __, 230 P. 1065, 1070
(1924), which criticized Frazier, and said, "[t]his assertion lay beyond the boundary of
the courts information. Such a thing [a joint will without a contract] is not only possi-
ble, but occurred in the case now under decision .. " See also Eagleton, Joint and
Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CORNELL
L.Q. 358, 362 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Eagleton].
6. See Blank, Problem Areas in Will Drafting Under New York Law, 56 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 459, 480 (1982); Cook, The Contractual Wilk Invitation to Litigation
and Excess Taxation, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 909, 910-16 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Cook];
Mock, Wills: Problems Presented by the Use of Conjoint Wills, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 454
(1972).
7. Several leading commentators have expressed their views on the frequency
with which estate planners have utilized joint or mutual wills subject to contracts not
to revoke. Professor Bailey states:
The great increase during the last few decades of the number of
cases involving contracts, or alleged contracts, to make wills, or to devise
or bequeath property has been the subject of comment by writers and
judges. The increase has been particularly noticeable during the last
twenty years. The reasons are probably to be found in the generally in-
creased interest in estate planning which has resulted from an accelerated
accumulation of wealth and the impact of estate and inheritance taxes.
This accounts for the fact that a very large number of cases involving
contracts, or alleged contracts, to make wills are arrangements between
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One of the most troublesome. areas for the courts is determin-
ing testator intent when it is alleged that a joint or mutual will was
executed pursuant to a contract or contract not to revoke,8 but no
express written contract was executed along with the will." A deter-
mination that a will is subject to an oral or implied contract" binds
the testators to a certain testamentary plan." Such a determination
is a fertile ground for controversy due to the contrasting nature of
the law of wills and the law of contracts. 2 While it is well established
husband and wife which look to the execution of a joint and reciprocal will
or separate mutual wills.
Bailey, Contracts to Make Wills-Proof of Intent to Contract, 40 TEX. L. REV. 941
(1962); see also Young, The Doctrinal Relationships of Concerted Wills and Contract,
29 TEX. L. REV. 439 (1951):
Some of the sharpest pressures at work in the judicial process are
those bearing on the treatment of concerted wills. The number of such
wills-either joint, or mutual . . . which are presented to the courts each
year is rapidly increasing. This is not because of any question of their
validity.... Rather it is the chance of capitalizing on some special, super-
testamentary quality of concerted wills that mainly stimulates litigation
about them.
Id.
8. There may be a literal difference between a "contract to will" and a "con-
tract not to revoke a will." For the purposes of this note the effect is the same. If a
testator or testators enter into a contract to devise certain property in a particular
manner and one testator fails to fulfill that contract by devising property in a different
way, that testator has breached the contract. If two testators enter into a contract not
to revoke a joint will or mutual wills, and one testator revokes the subject will, that
testator has breached the contract. See generally 1 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS
§ 11.1 (1960). References to either contracts to will or contracts not to revoke are viewed
as essentially the same in this note.
In Indiana, the courts appear to treat contracts to will and contracts not to
revoke a will similarly. See Estate of Maloney v. Carsten, __ Ind. App. -, 406
N.E.2d 1263 (1978), a "contract not to revoke" a joint will case which cites as control-
ling Cramer v. Echelbarger, 142 Ind. App. 374, 234 N.E.2d 864 (1968), a "contract to
will" case.
9. See infra notes 105-73 and accompanying text.
10. In a majority of states, the contract which binds testators to the
testamentary scheme of the will subject to such contract can be a written, oral, or im-
plied contract. In Indiana a contract to devise can be oral, written or implied. See
Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 490, 59 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1945).
11. See Cook, supra note 6, at 910 for a general discussion of the inflexibility
of a testamentary plan subject to a contract not to revoke. See generally Bailey, Con-
tracts to Make Wills-Proof of Intent to Contract, 40 TEx. L. REV. 941 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Bailey]; Young, The Doctrinal Relationships of Concerted Wills
and Contract, 29 TEX. L. REV. 439 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Young]. See also infra
notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
12. Mowrer, Joint and Mutual Wills-Effect of Contract Not to Revoke, 41
Mo. L. REV. 127, 128 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mowrer].
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that testators may validly agree to dispose of their estates in a par-
ticular manner through contract," the practice is subject to close
scrutiny." A basic feature of a will is that the testator is free at any
time to revoke or change the provisions in the will." This ambula-
tory characteristic contradicts the basic purpose of a contract which
is to bind both sides to certain terms from a certain time forward."6
Contractual and testamentary principles collide when a joint or
mutual will subject to a contract not to revoke is revoked by the
surviving testator.7
Indiana law provides that one seeking to establish a contract
not to revoke a joint or mutual will must prove irrevocability by
"clear and convincing" evidence. 8 The rationale for this strict stand-
ard lies in the consequences of a contract not to revoke a will.'
However, recent Indiana Appellate decisions show that the clear
and convincing standard is not applied with the same consistency to
similar claims of contractual joint or mutual wills.2 Recent decisions
show that in various circumstances the court will display inconsist-
ent degrees of sympathy towards third-party beneficiaries who
claim they have been defrauded.2' These inconsistent decisions
create an environment for potential excess litigation because the
court, at times, displays its willingness to find an implied or oral
contract based on inconclusive evidence.' At other times the court
appears unbending and will not find a contract based on evidence
which would have sufficed in the cases where the court was liberal
in applying the clear and convincing standard. 3 In addition, the
13. Id. See also Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 490 59 N.E.2d 568, 570
(1945).
14. See Teason v. Niles, 368 Mich. 474, 118 N.W.2d 475 (1962). Although this
case involved an oral contract to devise land in exchange for services rendered, the
court generally examined the caution necessary in establishing a contract to will.
15. See Mowrer, supra note 11, at 128. See also Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind.
App. 485, 490, 59 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1945); Manrow v. Deveney, 109 Ind. App. 264, 266,
33 N.E.2d 371, 372 (1941).
16. See Mowrer, supra note 11, at 128. A general definition of a contract is
located in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: "A contract is a promise or a set
of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 1 (1981).
17. See Mowrer, supra note 12, at 128.
18. Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 489, 59 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1945).
19. See infra, notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
20. See infra, notes 105-73 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. See infra, notes 105-39 and accompanying text.
23. See infra, notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
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courts have unsuccessfully tried to distinguish those cases where
contracts have been found from those cases where contracts have
been denied.24 Considering the court's inconsistency, an attorney
may be doing his client a disservice by not pursuing a claim of a con-
tract in any joint or mutual will controversy which is the least bit
ambiguous as to what the testator's intentions were at execution.
This note will focus on the inconsistent manner in which Indiana
courts have applied the clear and convincing standard to claims of
oral and implied contracts to devise as they pertain to joint or
mutual wills. The analysis will serve as support for the suggestion
that the courts make clear the burden of proving testator intent to
contract; or Indiana abandon the clear and convincing standard and
join an increasing number of states in adopting a statutory rule
which allows only written evidence to establish a contract to
devise. 5 This position is based on the premise that testators who
really desire to enter into a binding contract not to revoke their
testamentary dispositions will do so with a contract which is clear,
definite and specific. A writing, evidencing the contract, may be the
only sure way to prove the testators agreed not to revoke their
wills.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS OF A CONTRACT TO DEVISE
A brief discussion of joint and mutual wills in general, and of
how other jurisdictions deal with contracts not to revoke them, will
help highlight the problem Indiana courts encounter in determining
the existence of an oral or implied contract to devise. Joint and
mutual wills prove troublesome to many courts. A contractual joint
or mutual will severely limits the surviving testator's ability to use
estate property. This limitation on use would not be a factor if the
testators intended to execute a joint or mutual will but did not in-
tend the will or wills to be subject to a contract. Thus, the court
must be sure the testators intended their testamentary dispositions
to be irrevocable and subject to a contract at execution.
Establishing a Contract Not to Revoke
Because there are no legal consequences unique to a joint or
mutual will absent a contract not to revoke, 6 the main question in-
24. Id.
25. See infra, note 72.
26. See J. DUKEMINIER & S.M. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS:
WILLS, TRUSTS, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 365 (1972). See also Joint or
Mutual Wills, supra note 3, at 677.
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volved when confronted with one of these instruments is whether it
was executed pursuant to such a contract. When a claimant alleges a
will is subject to a contract, unequivocal proof of that contract is
essential." A court must determine, in accordance with the intention
of the parties; whether a certain set of operative facts resulted in
the loss by the testators of the privilege to revoke the will.28 Once
the existence of the contract is settled, other pertinent matters in-
volving the will or wills can be resolved.'
In some situations it is not difficult to prove the existence of a
contract not to revoke. A separate written contract may declare the
accompanying will or wills irrevocable.' A will may make direct
27. J. DUKEMINIER, S.M. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS,
TRUSTS, FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE PLANNING 365 (1972); Joint and Mutual Wills,
supra note 3, at 677.
28. Id: Two views have emerged from courts addressing contracts to devise.
Some courts give preference to contractual principles and hold that not only is the con-
tract enforceable but it also usurps any ambulatory characteristic of the will associated
with that contract. In this case the will is deemed irrevocable upon the death of one
testator. See Frazier v. Patterson, 243 II. 80, 84-86, 90 N.E. 216, 218 (1909).
The more widely accepted view is that a will is revocable at any time even if the
will is subject to a contract not to revoke. Meake v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 P. 1065
(1924). The contract cannot destroy the ambulatory characteristic of the will per se.
However, if a will which was executed pursuant to a contract not to revoke is revoked,
the damaged party will have a remedy in specific performance or equity. In this situa-
tion, the court will not be forced to probate a will it knows the testator did not intend
as his last will and testament, but the court will also be able to provide a remedy to a
wronged party.
29. The determination that a contract not to revoke binds the testators to the
testamentary scheme in a will may have effect on other issues related to the claim.
Once the existence of a contract has been established and the court determines that
there has been breach of that contract, it may proceed with a remedy. The co-testator
who has been wronged by the breach has a remedy at law or in equity. Very few cases
arise for a remedy at law. 1 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS § 10.27 (1960). See also
Joint or Mutual Wills, supra note 3, at 683 n.53.
Relief is also available for defrauded third-party beneficiaries. Courts will im-
pose a constructive trust on the promisor's estate, heirs and devisees. Id. For a discus-
sion of the various remedies and implications arising from a contract not to revoke, see
Mowrer, supra note 11, at 129-32. See generally Eagleton, supra note 5, at 363.
Other implications arising from a contract not to revoke a joint or mutual will
include effects on the surviving testator's use of estate property and effect on the use
of the marital deduction. For an excellent review of the effects of a contractual will,
see C. GROMLEY, J. HILLER, D. HOEPPNER, INDIANA ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES §
11E0.3 (1962).
In Maloney v. Carsten, __ Ind. App. -, 381 N.E.2d 1263 (1978), the court
discussed the implications a contract not to revoke would have on after-acquired prop-
erty, jointly-held property, and lapse statutes. These considerations are all beyond the
scope of this note.
30. See Note, Contracts Not to Revoke Joint or Mutual Wills, 15 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 144, 145 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Contracts Not to Revoke].
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reference in its provisions to a separate contract not to revoke be-
tween the testators31 The will or wills themselves may expressly
provide that in consideration of reciprocal provisions both testators
agree not to alter or change any disposition without the consent of
the other.2 In these three situations the intent of the testators to
enter into a contract not to revoke at the time of execution is clear.
Without mutual consent to the contrary, the dispositions in the will
are forever binding." There is no need for judicial interpretation.
A contract becomes less discernable when a joint or mutual
will is executed without reference to, or along with, an express writ-
ten contract." Still, many claims are based on the allegation of an
oral or implied contract binding the testators to their original
testamentary plan.' A typical claim involves third-party benefici-
aries named in an original joint or mutual will versus beneficiaries
named in a subsequent will.' The second will was executed by the
surviving testator of the original joint or mutual will, but provides
for a different distribution of the same property than was set out in
the original will. Further, the second will operates to revoke the
original joint or mutual will. When the surviving testator dies, the
second will is probated. 7 The beneficiaries of the original will realize
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Shimp v. Shimp, - Md. App. -, 412 A.2d 1228 (1980),
where the testators expressly provided in the will itself their intention to enter into a
binding contract. The relevant text provided:
We, the Testators, do hereby declare that it is our purpose to dispose of
our property in accordance with a common plan. The reciprocal and other
gifts made herein are in fulfillment of this purpose and in consideration of
each of us waiving the right, during our joint lives, to alter, amend or
revoke this Will in whole or in part, by Codicil or otherwise, without
notice to the other, or under any circumstances after the death of the
first of us to die. Unless mutually agreed upon, this Last Will and Testa-
ment is an irrevocable act and may not be changed.
Id. at -, 412 A.2d at 1229. See also Sample v. Butler Univ., 211 Ind. 122, 4 N.E.2d
545, reh'g denied, 211 Ind. 122, 5 N.E.2d 888 (1936).
33. Contracts Not to Revoke, supra note 29, at 145.
34. In Glass v. Battista, 43 N.Y.2d 620, 374 N.E.2d 116 (1978), the court said:
"The law does not view the renunciation of the right to alter or revoke a will as a
casual matter . . . and in keeping with this principle we have declined to find joint or
mutual wills contractually binding where such intent was left to conjecture." Id. at
__. 347 N.E.2d at 117.
35. See infra, notes 4-16 and accompanying text.
36. See infra, notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
37. The clear weight of authority views a joint or mutual will subject to a con-
tract not to revoke on the same footing as any other will in terms of its revocability.
All wills are revocable and a revoked will even if subject to a contract not to revoke
should be denied probate. 1 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS § 11.10 (1960). The rights of
the defrauded third-party beneficiaries and co-testator, if applicable, will be saved
19831
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they have been treated differently under the second will. The
original beneficiaries bring an action against the beneficiaries of the
second will or the estate of the surviving testator on the grounds
that the original will was executed pursuant to a contract not to
revoke. The claim alleges that the surviving testator was estopped
from executing a second will after the death of the original co-
testator. In this situation most courts will look at all available
evidence to try to ascertain whether the original testators
manifested an intent to enter into a contract not to revoke the
original will. The court's major goal is to give full effect to the inten-
tion of the testators without adding what the testators did not
themselves intend."
When confronted with a claim of a contract not to revoke, a
court must consider important competing interests." Strong policy
considerations exist against any restraint on property. The intent to
deprive oneself of the right to freely dispose of property must be
clear.' The far-reaching consequences of contracting away am-
bulatory testamentary rights demands an unequivocal showing of in-
tent."' The surviving spouse of a married couple when bound by a
contract not to revoke can be left helpless to intervening changes of
circumstances.' A remarriage, the death of intended beneficiaries,
an increase or decrease in the size of the estate, mere change of
heart or similar unforeseen events may render provisions of a prior
will inappropriate, unfair or meaningless." Many times, the deceased
spouse, had that spouse survived, would have acquiesced to ap-
propriate or necessary changes in the testamentary scheme of a
joint or mutual will even if subject to a contract." When a court
holds that a contract binds the surviving testator to an existing
joint or mutual will, these important considerations may be left un-
protected.
through equity. See Partridge, The Revocability of Mutual or Reciprocal Wills, 77 U.
PA. L. REV. 357, 360 (1929); but see Goddard, Mutual Wills, 17 MIcH. L. REV. 677, 687
(1919).
38. See supra, note 34. See also Moore v. Harvey, __ Ind. App.....
406 N.E.2d 354, 358 (1980).
39. In interpreting joint or mutual wills "it is essential ... that we distinguish
between the concept of wills and the concept of contracts." Maloney v. Carsten, -
Ind. App. - - 381 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (1978). See infra notes 40-52 and accompa-
nying text.
40. Moore v. Harvey, - Ind. App. 406 N.E.2d 354, 358 (1980).
41. Id.
42. See Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213, 1218 (2d Cir. 1972).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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The interests of the deceased testator are equally important.
The court should not destroy the peace-of-mind a testator gains
through knowing his loved ones are provided for in case of his
death. If the decedent and surviving testator at the time of execu-
tion intended the dispositions to be forever binding, such an agree-
ment must be enforced. Many couples agree to give only a life
estate in property to the surving spouse with ultimate fee owner-
ship to named third-party beneficiaries. These testators rely on the
validity of a contract not to revoke. The change of heart or circum-
stances of the surviving testator, no matter how compelling, should
not affect the enforcement of a valid contract. Further, an unequivo-
cal showing of intent to enter into a contract is necessary to safe-
guard against fraudulent claims against a deceased's estate. 5 Once a
testator dies, his opportunity to answer any claim against his estate
is terminated."'
The effects of a contract to devise are equally compelling so
that a court must make certain the actual intent of the testator was
to enter a contract. If the contractual will provides certain benefits
for third parties, the rights created in these third persons are held
to be enforceable by the third parties.17 Thus, when testators agree
to bind themselves into a contractual will and provide for certain
third-party beneficiaries in that will, they have lost certain flexibility
in their ability to plan their estate. 8 Before one of the contracting
testators dies, it may be argued that at least that portion of the will
under contract, which provides for a third party, cannot be revoked
without the consent of. that third party."'
At the death of one of the testators of a contractual joint or
mutual will, the ability of the survivor to use the estate property is
restricted.' Courts display concern over the chance that the sur-
vivor will use up or transfer estate property inter vivos, and usually
will try to assert some control over the testator's use of his own
property." Before a court will'exert such control, there must be a
clear showing that the subject property is bound by a contract that
both testators intended to enter.
45. SPARKS, supra note 1, at 26.
46. Id.
47. C. GROMLEY, J. HILLER, D. HOEPPNER, WORKBOOK FOR INDIANA ESTATE




51. Id. See Sample v. Butler Univ., 211 Ind. 122, 4 N.E.2d 545, 5 N.E.2d 888
(1936).
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A minority of courts hold that mere execution of a joint or
mutual will creates a presumption that the parties intended the will
to be subject to a contract not to revoke.2 These courts hold the in-
ference of contract to be especially strong when a husband and wife
execute a joint or mutual will with reciprocal provisions and name
third-party beneficiaries in whom both testators share a common in-
terest.' Courts which follow the "presumption" position are criti-
cized for losing sight of the distinction between an "understanding"
and an actual contract." Further, the "presumption" courts do not
realize that closely related testators may reach informal accords
with no intention of forming a binding contract.' The mere execu-
tion of a joint or mutual will does not clearly indicate the requisites
for a binding contract." Thus, the clear weight of authority provides
no presumption of contract from the execution of a joint or mutual
will alone. 7
52. The leading case asserting the presumption position concerning joint wills
is Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E.2d 216 (1909).
53. See In re Estate of Chayka, 40 Wis. 2d 715, - , 162 N.W.2d 632, 634
(1968). It should be noted that some courts hold the presumption of contract stronger
from the execution of a joint will as opposed to the execution of mutual wills. "[A] con-
tract to make mutual and reciprocal wills may be conclusively presumed or inferred
from provisions of the wills themselves, especially if there is a jointly executed will."
(emphasis added) Id. The rationale here is that executing one instrument infers a
mutual agreement or understanding. But see SPARKS, supra note 1, at 29 which is
critical of this presumption.
54. See Contracts Not to Revoke, supra note 29, at 144.
55. Joint or Mutual Wills, supra note 3, at 677.
56. Although the parties "agreed" to the dispositions set forth in the will, it is
tenuous to hold such an understanding as the basis for an implied contract. The mere
presence of a joint will or mutual wills with reciprocal provisions discloses only that
the testators talked over their desires for testamentary distributions, and arrived at
some understanding. However, wills executed by relatives due to love and affection in-
fer mutual trust, loyalty and concern for one another more than contractual intent.
Professor Sparks states: "such discussion and such understandings between persons of
close affinities, especially between husbands and wives, are not unusual and the fact
that they have taken place is no indication that there has been any thought of a bind-
ing contract." SPARKS, supra note 1, at 26-28. More logical in the case of close relatives
is that similarity or reciprocity in wills results from similar tastes and affections caused
by years of being together. Spontaneous executions of this type may be unaccom-
panied by any thought of forever binding the other testator to the will provisions. 1
BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS § 11.1 554 (1960). Situations and desires change. A lov-
ing spouse may choose to leave the ultimate disposition to the judgment of the surviv-
ing spouse rather than to prevent that survivor in later years from making necessary
or emergency changes in the estate plan. Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.
1972).
57. All of the following cases assert that the mere execution of joint or
mutual wills will not be sufficient to establish an implied contract: Parker v. Richards,
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A majority of courts recognize the far-reaching consequences of
a contract not to revoke a will. These courts recognize that claims of
an implied contract against a decedent's estate is an area open for
abuse." In an effort to provide for all interests involved, these
courts demand a substantial showing of intent to enter into a con-
tract. 9 A majority of courts state that evidence to substantiate an
implied contract or oral contract must be "clear and convincing, cer-
tain and unequivocal.""
- Or. App. - , 602 P.2d 1154 (1979); Shook v. Bell, Wyo. - , 599 P.2d 1320
(1979); Moats v. Pumphrey, - Md. App. - , 363 A.2d 589 (1976); In re Wiggins, 39
N.Y.2d 791, 385 N.Y.S.2d 287, 350 N.E.2d 618 (1976); Twombly v. Twombly, - Okl.
-, 489 P.2d 475 (1971); Ellexson v. Ellexson, - Tex. Cir. App. , 475 S.W.2d
515 (1971); Wagner v. Moor, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S.W.2d (1914).
The better reasoned view is that mere execution of a joint or mutual will is not
substantial evidence of any underlying contract. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
WILLS 44 (2d ed. 1943). The clear weight of authority provides that no assumption of a
contract exists from simply the execution of a concerted will. The fact that two
testators, closely related and emotionally involved, execute a will or wills with
reciprocal provisions does no more than evidence a present agreement for the distri-
bution of property. If the distribution was to be made the day of execution, the
dispositive scheme provided for in the will would be how the testators wanted their
property to be provided at the time. This is no indication that the parties intended
that scheme to be forever binding. Without other evidence of the intent of the parties
to bind themselves forever to the terms, an implied contract cannot stand. SPARKS,
supra note 1, at 27.
58. See SPARKS, supra note 1, at 25-26.
59. Id. at 26-30.
60. See, e.g., Estate of Somogyi v. Marosites, 389 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (The agreement "must be established by clear and convincing
evidence."); Northern Trust Co. v. Tarre, 83 Ill. App. 3d 684, __, 404 N.E.2d 882, 887
(1980) ("The burden is upon the party who asserts a contract to establish it by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence."); Estate of Ryder v. McCloskey, 219 N.W.2d 552
(Iowa, 1974); Estate of Wade v. DeTar, 202 Kan. 380, -, 449 P.2d 488, 494 (1969)
(contract must be "clear in its terms" and established by "clear and convincing
evidence"); Shimp v. Shimp, 387 Md. 372, __, 412 A.2d 1228, 1233 (1979); ("The proof
must be clear and explicit leaving no room for reasonable doubt."); Eicholtz v.
Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666, - , 21 N.W.2d 914 (1946); Neff v. Poboisk, 281 Minn. 475,
__., 161 N.W.2d 823, 824 (1968) (evidence must be "clear, positive and convincing");
Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. 1967 (evidence must be "clear, cogent and con-
vincing"); Estate of Weidner, 628 P.2d 285, 286 (Mont. 1981) ("The burden is on the
party asserting the existence of the contract and it must be shown by clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence."); Johnson v. Wilson, 276 Or. 69, - , 554 P.2d 157, -
(1976) ("[Proof] by clear and convincing evidence means that the trust of the facts
asserted is highly probable."); Lancelloti v. Lancellotti, - R.I. , - , 377 A.2d
1315, - (1977); Pruitt v. Moss, 271 S.C. 305, - , 247 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1978) ("...
clear and convincing proof' is necessary to support a finding of contract); Magids v.
American Title Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. 1971) ("Oral contracts" are only sustained
when established by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.").
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Despite the good-faith effort by the courts to require a clear
showing of contractual intent, in practice the amount and kinds of
evidence which will convince the court of the existence of an implied
contract varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,8 and also between
courts in the same jurisdiction.2 Because each set of circumstances
61. For an example of the different results various states' courts can arrive at
based on similar claims and similar evidence, compare Simmons v. Davis, 240 Ga. 282,
240 S.E.2d 33 (1977) with Estate of Kester, __ Pa. - 383 A.2d 914 (1978). In Sim-
mons, a husband and wife executed a joint will which provided that the survivor would
receive all the property in fee simple, and then divided up between the testator's
brothers and sisters. There was no written contract executed along with the will nor
any mention in the will of a contract or promise not to revoke. The Georgia Supreme
Court held the will was subject to a contract. The court based its decision on an earlier
Georgia decision which held that a contract can be more readily implied from the ex-
ecution of a joint will. Id. at -, 240 S.E.2d at 34, citing Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga.
738, 144 S.E. 319 (1978). The court further stated that the provisions of the will which
left property in fee to the survivor and upon the survivor's death to the testator's
brothers and sisters was evidence of a "clear and definite" contract. Simmons, 240 Ga.
at -, 240 S.E.2d at 34.
In Kester, a husband and wife also executed a joint will which provided for the
survivor to receive all property in fee "subject to the contingency" that the survivor
leave the entire estate to their son. After the husband died, the wife executed a new
will devising much of the estate property to sources other than the son. The son
brought an action claiming the original will was subject to a contract and the new ex-
ecution of another will was in derrogation of that contract. Despite provisions in the
will itself which stated:
In the event, however, that we shall both die as the result of a common
accident or disease, we shall be deemed to have both died at the same
time (even though there be a reasonable interval of time between our
respective deaths), and in this event, or in the event either one of us sur-
vives the other, it is our wish and mutual understanding that we give,
devise and bequeath our entire estate as follows . . .
Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held there was no contract. The court stated:
When it is claimed that someone has contractually limited his testamen-
tary freedom, our standard of proof is a demanding one. In the case of a
joint will in which extrinsic evidence is relied upon to prove the existence
of a contract, we have held that the proof must be "clear and convincing."
Likewise, in cases not involving joint wills, but involving the issue of
whether there existed a contract to make a will or not to revoke a will,
the rule has been that evidence of the existence of a contract must be
clear and convincing.
Id. at __ 383 A.2d at 918; see also Nakoneczny Estate, 456 Pa. 327, 319 A.2d 893
(1974); Vanjentic Estate, 453 Pa. 1, 306 A.2d 300 (1973); Fahringer v. Strine, 420 Pa. 48,
216 A.2d 82 (1966).
62. For an example of how courts in the same jurisdiction can arrive at incon-
sistent results based on similar facts and evidence, compare Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19
N.Y.2d 228, 278 N.Y.S.2d 845, 225 N.E.2d 540 (1967), with Matter of Zeh, 18 N.Y.2d
900, 276 N.Y.S.2d 635, 223 N.E.2d 43 (1966). In Mueller, a joint will provided in part:
SECOND: The first deceased hereby bequeaths and devises all real
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is unique, the method of shifting through available evidence, evalu-
ating it and applying the clear and convincing standard to it, creates
an ad hoc procedure." Inherent in any ad hoc procedure is the
chance for inconsistency." Nowhere is the inconsistency more visible
than in joint or mutual will cases, where the court must apply an
ambiguous evidentiary standard to countless different sets of facts.",
One case simply does not serve as a guide for the next." When one
case cannot be used to predict the outcome of the next or when two
seemingly similar cases result in different holdings, the effec-
tiveness of the judicial process comes under attack. This in turn
generates excess litigation.
and personal property of whatever kind and wherever situated to the sur-
vivor of us outright.
THIRD: Upon the death of the second one of us to die, or in the
event of our simultaneous deaths or deaths resulting from a common
disaster, then the estate of said second decedent, or both of us as the case
may be, is hereby bequeathed, devised and disposed of as follows: ....
FOURTH: All the rest, residue and remainder of the estate or
estates . . . we hereby give, devise and bequeath equally between Ruth
Hanzlicsek and Wilma Rubenstein aforesaid.
J. DUKMINIER, S. JOHANSEN, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 387-88 n.1 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter Dukminier & Johansen]. The court em-
phasized the use of plural pronouns in the third and fourth clause and the fact that the
will made a gift over on the death of the survivor. Based on this evidence, the court
found a contract.
In Zeh, decided four months earlier by the same court, a joint will stated in
part:
SECOND: We give, devise and bequeath all of the Estate, of what-
soever kind and nature and wheresoever situated, of which we, or either
of us, may die seized and/or possessed . . . each unto the other, meaning
thereby that the survivor of us shall be the absolute owner, to him or to
her . . .absolutely and forever of all that both of us possess.
THIRD: Upon the death of the survivor of us, or in the event that
our deaths should occur simultanously, or approximately so, or in the
same common accident or disaster, . . . we, or the survivor of us, give,
devise and bequeath unto our children Fanny Rebecca Howell and
William Arthur Zeh all of the Estate of which we, or said survivor, shall
die seized and/or possessed. ...
J. DUKMINIER & S. JOHANSEN, supra, at 388. The court failed to mention the gift over
in the third clause and despite similar wording and the use of plural pronouns as used
in Muller, the court held the will was not contractual. The court in Zeh placed great
emphasis on the words of the gift in the second clause which gave the survivor all of
the property "absolutely and forever." J. DUKEMINIER, S. JOHANSON, supra, at 384-92.
63. See Young, supra note 11, at 444.
64. Id.; see also SPARKS, supra note 1, at 26-29.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Professor Eagleton states that in the usual case there are five general
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The Uniform Probate Code or a Requirement of a Writing
A growing minority of states are not satisfied with the results
when extrinsic evidence is allowed to establish the existence of a
contract not to revoke a will." Recognizing the problems of incon-
sistent holdings and excess litigation, 9 these states have adopted
some form of statutory law which allows only written evidence to
establish that a will is subject to a contract.7 Almost all of these
statutes are modeled after or adoptions of Section 2-701 of the
Uniform Probate Code.7' Section 2-701 states:
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will
or devise, or to die intestate, if executed after the effective
date of this Act, can be established only by (1) provisions of
a will stating material provisions of the contract; (2) an ex-
press reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic
evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a writing
signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. The execu-
tion of a joint will or mutual will does not create a pre-
sumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills."2
This provision covers all contracts to wills including those found in
joint or mutual wills.73
types of evidence from a consideration of all of which the intention of the testators to
enter in a contract must be determined:
1. A separate written contract;
2. The wills themselves;
3. Surrounding circumstances;
4. Oral statements of the parties made in reference to the execution of
the will or wills;
5. The scheme of distribution in the wills.
See Eagleton, supra note 11, at 373. See also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., the official comment to Maine's adoption of a written require-
ment for contractual will states: "It is the purpose of this section to tighten the
methods by which contracts concerning succession may be proved." ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18A § 2-701 (1979). See also infra note 75.
69. See infra note 75.
70. See infra note 72.
71. The following states have adopted Section 2-701: Alaska - ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.11 285 (198-); Arizona - ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2701 (1974); Colorado - COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-701 (1974); Florida - FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732-701 (1975) (West); Idaho -
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-701 (1971); Maine - ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 2-701 (1979);
Michigan - MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 700.140 (1978); Minnesota - MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.2-701 (1975); Nebraska - NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2351 (1974); New Mexico - N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-701 (1975); North Dakota - N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-13 (1973); Utah
- UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-701 (1975).
72. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-701 (1977).
73. Id.
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Under this section, oral or implied contracts not to revoke joint
or mutual wills are no longer valid."' The Code discourages the prac-
tice of basing a contract not to revoke on outside circumstances and
facts surrounding the execution of a will.7" Section 2-701 requires a
signed writing by the decedent as minimum evidence of the con-
tract." A will, to suffice as this signed writing, must set out the
material provisions of the contract or make express reference to a
contract." Further, the denial of the creation of a presumption of a
contract from the mere execution of a joint or mutual will is in ac-
cordance with the weight of authority."
Section 2-701 has been subjected to the criticism that it is too
vague. 7' The critics claim that while it suggests the methods by
which a contract not to revoke must be established, it fails to define
those factors which will assure the parties acted with the requisite
contractual intent." The general point of disfavor with the section is
that it will not afford enough protection in the case of joint or
mutual wills against the danger of finding a contract where no in-
tent to contract really existed. 1
A close reading of Section 2-701, however, reveals that such
criticism is misplaced. The section does set down strict guidelines
for determining whether a will was executed pursuant to a
74. See Curry, West Virginia and the Uniform Probate Code: An Overview
Part 1, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 145 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Curry].
75. The Comment to Section 2-701 states:
It is the purpose of this section to tighten the methods by which contracts
concerning succession may be proved. Oral contracts not to revoke wills
have given rise to much litigation in a number of states; and in many
states if two persons execute a single document as their joint will, this
gives rise to a presumption that the parties had contracted not to revoke
the will except by consent of both. This section requires that either the
will must set forth the material provisions of the contract, or the will
must make express reference to the contract and extrinsic evidence [prov-
ing] the terms of the contract, or there must be a separate writing signed
by the decedent evidencing the contract. Oral testimony regarding the
contract is permitted if the will makes reference to the contract, but this
provision of the statute is not intended to affect normal rules regarding
admissability of evidence.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-701 comment (1977).
76. See supra note 66.
77. See supra note 69.
78. See Contracts Not to Revoke, supra note 29.
79. Id. at 152. See also ROLLISON, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE 18 (1970).
80. See Contracts Not to Revoke, supra note 39, at 152.
81. Id. See generally Curry, supra note 39, at 152.
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contract.2 Without express written reference to a contract or a
separate writing of a contract, none can be implied to exist. 3 The
extrinsic factors, which the critics say are not defined, will only be
allowed to prove the terms of a contract after express written
evidence of a contractual understanding is apparent."'
The official comment to Section 2-701 clearly shows the criti-
cism of the section is without merit. 5 The comment states that the
will must set forth the material provisions of the contract or make
express reference to a contract in the will for an adopting jurisdic-
tion to hold a contract exists." The comment also states that the
only way a writing in and of itself will be enough to prove a con-
tract exists will be a writing other than the will." This separate
writing suggests a separate written contract, and stifles the
criticism that the courts can still find a contract only from ambigu-
ous terminology in the text of a will. This section will only accept an
express writing as evidence of intent to contract. This section does
afford substantial protection against finding a contract where there
is no indication in a will itself whether the testators intended to
enter into a binding contract.
The Uniform Probate Code has taken a legitimate step toward
clearing up the inherent problems in executing joint or mutual wills.
State legislators are cognizant of the confusion surrounding ascer-
taining testators' intent and many states are seriously considering
the adoption of Section 2-701 or similar writing requirements. Since
its acceptance in 1969, twelve of the fourteen states which have
adopted all or part of the Code have adopted Section 2-701." Still
other states, which have not adopted the code, have seen fit to in-
clude in their probate statutes writing requirement provisions
modeled after 2-701.89 The number of states adopting a writing re-
82. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
83. Id.




88. See supra note 65.
89. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon 1980):
Section 59A. Contracts Concerning Succession
(a) A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or
devise, if executed or entered into on or after September 1, 1979, can be
established only by provisions of a will stating that a contract does exist
and stating the material provisions of the contract.
(b) The execution of a joint will or reciprocal will does not by
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quirement continues to grow as state courts continue to reach
unclear and inconsistent contractual will decisions.
CONTRACTUAL JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS IN INDIANA
The validity of a contract to devise is unquestioned in Indiana."
A testator or group of testators may create a binding contract to
dispose of their property through will in a particular manner.91 Such
a contract will be enforceable as long as it possesses the usual con-
tractual requisites.2 It follows then that a contract or contract not
to revoke created pursuant to a joint or mutual will is valid and en-
forceable and will bind the executing testators to the testamentary
dispositions in the will or wills.
Essential to any contract is proof of its existence. In the case of
a contract to devise, a court must be especially careful in evaluating
evidence purporting to establish the existence of an oral or implied
contract due to the notion that testators intending their wills to be
irrevocable pursuant to a contract probably would want to state
such clearly and sufficiently and not leave to conjecture what can be
settled in a few written words of promise. 3 Contracts to devise are
itself suffice as evidence of the existence of a contract.
See also N.J.S.A. 3B:1-4. Although New Jersey has not adopted the Uniform Probate
Code, it has adopted an identical section to Section 2-701 entitled "Contractual Ar-
rangements Relating to Death." Id.
90. See Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 490, 59 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1945);
Manrow v. Deveney, 104 Ind. App. 264, 266, 33 N.E.2d 371, 372 (1941).
91. Id.
92. The contract must include valid consideration, certainty and definiteness
in its terms and mutual assent. It must be fair and just. See Lawrence v. Ashba, 115
Ind. App. 485, 490, 59 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1945), citing Plemmons v. Pemberton, 346 Mo.
45, 139 S.W.2d 910 (1940).
93. Professor Sparks discusses the difference between a mere agreement be-
tween testators and an actual consent between them:
When two people execute a common document as the will of each of them
or when they execute separate documents at approximately the same
time and in identical or almost identical language there is a tendency to
pass too easily to the conclusion that such action must have been the
result of a contract.
The clear weight of authority, and certainly the sounder view, is
that the mere presence of either joint or mutual wills does not raise any
presumption that they were executed in pursuance of a contract. Nor is
this rule altered by evidence that the parties had "agreed" to the making
of such wills. Of course they had so agreed. The mere presence of such
wills reveals that the parties must have talked the matter over and must
have arrived at an understanding or agreement concerning their
testamentary dispositions. Such discussions and such understandings be-
tween persons of close affinities, especially between husbands and wives,
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not well accepted by the entire legal profession."' Thus, unequivocal
proof that the testators knowingly and willingly intended their wills
to be burdened by the constraints of a contract is most important
for the legitimacy of a decision finding such a contract.
The burden of proof that a joint or mutual will was executed
pursuant to a valid contract is on the party who asserts that the
contract exists. 5 At the present time Indiana courts follow the ma-
jority of courts in allowing a wide variety of extrinsic evidence to
prove an underlying contract to devise." When confronted with the
claim of a contract or contract not to revoke a joint or mutual will, a
court will first look for written evidence of an express contract. 7
are not unusual and the fact that they have taken place is no indication
that there has been any thought of a binding contract.
SPARKS, supra note 1, at 27-28.
94. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. See also Joint and Mutual
Wills, supra note 3, at 679 ("Contracts to devise are not favored children of the law.").
See also Moore v. Harvey, - Ind. App. -, -, 406 N.E.2d 354, 358 (1980).
95. See Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 490, 59 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1945),
citing Edson v. Parsons, 155 N.Y. 555, 50 N.E. 265 (1898).
96. See infra notes 105-74 and accompanying text. See supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Mountz v. Brown, 119 Ind. App. 38, 81 N.E.2d 374 (1948). In
Mountz a husband and wife executed a written contract where they agreed in con-
sideration of mutual devises that upon the death of the survivor their property should
be distributed as provided for by a previously executed joint will. The contract stated:
This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1934,
by and between Daniel Brown and Ettie V. Brown, husband and wife, of
Butler Indiana, Witnesses:
That whereas the said parties have heretofore entered into a cer-
tain joint will and contract, by which they agreed as to the final disposi-
tion of the property of which they shall die possessed and which joint will
and contract was executed by each of them for a good and valuable con-
sideration and is binding upon them, and which joint will and contract
was by them executed and witnessed when executed by Charles Swift
and Bertha Swift, his wife;
And whereas the said parties have mutually agreed and do now
agree that the final distribution and the disposition of their said property
shall be made in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said
joint contract and will;
And whereas the said parties desire to have mutually agreed that
during the life time of them and the survivor of them the terms of said
joint contract and will shall not take effect or become public and that the
survivor of them shall take all of said property at the death of the other
and hold the title to it absolutely so long as such survivor lives;
Therefore, in consideration of the mutual considerations resulting
from the execution and performance of this agreement and the execution
of the said several wills of the parties as herein provided for, it is agreed
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When there is no written contract or reference to a written con-
tract, the court then looks to the will document itself to determine
whether the provisions in it establish a contract. 8 When the will or
wills alone are not sufficient to establish a contract, the court will
go further and look to testimony of witnesses who know the facts, to
admissions, acts, and conduct of the parties, and to "other cir-
cumstances,"99 which may prove the existence of an underlying con-
that contemporaneous with the execution of the agreement, and in con-
sideration thereof, each of said parties shall execute a will whereby each
shall devise and bequeath to the other, in the event of the survival of said
other, all of the property both real and personal of which each shall die
possessed and that the survivor shall take and hold the said property dur-
ing the remainder of his or her life subject to the terms and conditions of
the said joint will and contract, and holding said property in trust only to
such extent as may be necessary to fully carry out the terms of the said
joint will and contract and to fully protect the rights of all persons for
whom provision is made and is to be made under the terms of said joint
will and contract, and upon the death of the survivor of these parties,
Daniel Brown and Ettie V. Brown, the said property then remaining of
which these parties, either and both of them died possessed, shall be
distributed as in said joint will and contract had been the last will and
testament of each and both of these parties.
And each of these parties covenant and agree, in consideration, of
the execution of the wills herein provided for and executed contem-
poraneous herewith, not to make any other or different disposition of any
of their property except as provided for herein and agree to fully perform
.and carry out all the terms and conditions of all of said agreements and
wills, including said instrument referred to as said joint will and contract.
Id. at __, 81 N.E.2d at 375-76. The importance of this early case is that it shows, in
certain terms, the testators' intent to enter into a contract making their testamentary
dispositions irrevocable. This detailed written contract, executed along with the accom-
panying wills, does not leave the testators' intent in doubt as in cases where an oral or
implied contract is alleged.
98. In Sample v. Butler Univ., 211 Ind. 122, 4 N.E.2d 545, reh'g denied,
modified on other grounds, 211 Ind. 122, 5 N.E.2d 888 (1936), mutual wills executed by
husband and wife stated in part:
Whereas, it has been agreed . . . that we shall each make a
separate will bearing the same date disposing of our property owned by
us jointly as husband and wife and situated in the State of Indiana, in
such a way that our children shall derive a certain benefit therefrom after
the death of the survivor of us, and that after said wills are so made
neither of us will revoke or destroy either of such wills or make any other
will or codicil without the full consent and agreement of both.
The court held that this provision was clearly determinative of the parties' intention to
enter into a contract not to revoke their wills. Id. at ___. 4 N.E.2d at 548. See also
Brown v. Union Trust Co. of Greensburg, 229 Ind. 404, 98 N.E.2d 901 (1951).
99. See Cramer v. Echelbarger, 142 Ind. App. 374, 377, 234 NE.2d 864 (1968);
Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 490, 59 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1945); Plemmons v.
Pemberton, 346 Mo. 45, -, 139 S.W.2d 910, 915 (1940). The criteria of "other cir-
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tract. The standard that Indiana courts adhere to is that evidence to
support a contract to devise must be "clear, definite, convincing,
unequivocal and satisfactory.""° On its face this standard appears to
be a demanding one.
Several recent Indiana Court of Appeals decisions show that
the state courts do not apply the clear and convincing standard con-
sistently or with the same rigidity. Through ambiguous and loose
language two distinct interpretations of the clear and convincing
standard as it applies to claims of oral or implied contracts pursuant
to joint or mutual wills emerge. In some cases the court is very
liberal in its interpretation of the clear and convincing standard and
appears willing to imply a contract from the mere execution of a
joint or mutual will as long as a few "magic" words of devise show
up in the will itself.' This practice is clearly against the weight of
authority throughout the country. 2 In other cases the court
retreats and becomes very demanding in its interpretation of the
clear and convincing standard.'013 In these latter cases the court
desires much more of a showing of contractual intent and will not
find a contract based on evidence which clearly would suffice in
those cases where the court was liberal in its clear and convincing
interpretation. Further, the court tries and fails to distinguish the
liberal interpretation from the stricter one, and in doing so leaves
the issue of determining testator intent in disarray.' 4 The following
discussion will highlight the inconsistency the court has shown in
the determination of testator intent concerning oral or implied con-
tracts executed pursuant to joint or mutual wills.
A Liberal Interpretation of the Clear and Convincing Standard
In Cramer v. Echelbarger,5 the court was confronted with a
will contest and action to quiet title based on the allegation that
cumstances" seems to leave open the question of various kinds of evidence arising
from the unique set of facts in each controversy.. "Other circumstances" remains
undefined under Indiana case law.
100. Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 490, 59 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1945),
citing Plemmons v. Pemberton, 346 Mo. 45, -, 134 S.W.2d 910, 918 (1940). See also
infra note 114.
101. See Estate of Maloney v. Carsten, - Ind. App. -, 381 N.E.2d 1263
(1978); Cramer v. Echelbarger, 142 Ind. App. 374, 234 N.E.2d 864 (1968). See also infra
notes 105-32 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 60.
103. See Moore v. Harvey, - Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 354 (1980); Wisler
v. McCormack, - Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 361 (1980).
104. See infra notes 105-39 and accompanying text.
105. 142 Ind. App. 374, 234 N.E.2d 864 (1968).
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mutual wills were executed pursuant to a contract which bound the
surviving testator to certain testamentary dispositions. A husband
and wife, both previously married, executed mutual wills. A provi-
sion of the wills stated that the survivor would receive all of the
property of the decedent testator, and that the survivor would will
or convey all of the property in that survivor's possession at death
to the daughter of the wife by a previous marriage. Of special in-
terest in this case was a farm the wife brought into the marriage
which was owned by her family for over one hundred twenty-five
years. Subsequent to the marriage of the testators, the farm was
conveyed through a trustee to both testators in the entirety.
At the wife's death, the husband took all of her property, in-
cluding the farm, pursuant to the will. He then remarried and had
all of his property reconveyed to himself and his third wife as ten-
ants by the entirety. He further executed a new will which left all of
his estate to his new wife if she survived him and only to his step-
daughter if his wife predeceased him.' The husband died and his
last will was entered into probate. His third wife survived him.
However, his step-daughter claimed the execution of the last will
and the act of having the farm and other property conveyed to him-
self and his third wife contravened a contract existing between him
and his second wife.
The court ruled that the original mutual wills were executed
pursuant to a valid and enforceable contract which bound the hus-
band to leave the farm and other property he received from his sec-
ond wife to his step-daughter. 7 Thus, the surviving husband's act of
reconveying the property and treating the step-daughter differently
under his new will was a breach of that contract. However, a look at
the evidence shows that the court was liberal in its application of
the clear and convincing standard to the evidence offered to estab-
lish the existence of a contract.
The court stated, without going into detail, that the evidence
showed an "agreement" between the testators was well known to
their friends and associates.'" The court further found credence in a
provision of the will which stated:
106. Actually, after the death of his second wife, the husband executed a series
of wills. The first will bequeathed his personal property to his third wife and his real
estate, including the farm, to his step-daughter. The second will devised one-half of the
real estate to his third wife and one-half to his step-daughter. The final execution be-
queathed to his third wife all of the real estate and only if she predeceased him would
it go to his step-daughter. Id. at 376-77, 234 N.E.2d at 866.
107. Id. at 377, 234 N.E.2d at 866.
108. This evidence is presumably oral testimony. Id.
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I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my property, be
the same real or personal, wherever situate, to my hus-
band .... In making this bequest, I am not unmindful of
my daughter . . . but have the fullest confidence in the
promise of my husband that, at his death, he will leave all
of our property of which he has possession to [her]."°
Based on this evidence alone the court ruled that a binding contract
existed between both testators and that the husband was bound to
leave the farm and other property pursuant to this contract to his
step-daughter."'
The evidence presented in Cramer is equivocal on the question
of the existence of a contract binding the testators to the disposi-
tions set forth in the mutual wills. There is no clear demonstration
that the testators mutually agreed that the survivor was bound to
leave all of his property in his possession at death to his step-
daughter. The evidence presented does show that the testators talked
of leaving property to the step-daughter; however, such talk falls
short of unequivocal proof of contract. The provision in the will of
the wife which the court found persuasive makes reference only to a
promise but not to a contract."1 The will says nothing definite about
the husband's rights or duties with his property while he is alive
and further states nothing about the farm in particular. The refer-
ence in the will to the wife's "fullest confidence" in her husband's
promise suggests that there may have been only a moral obligation
to leave the property to the step-daughter." Further, one must ask
why, if the testators intended to enter into a contract to devise,
such contract or reference to a contract does not appear in the will.
The Cramer court stated that a contract must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence, and that the contract must be clear,
definite and unequivocal."' The evidence presented falls short of
109. Id.
110. Id. at 376-77, 234 N.E.2d at 865-66.
111. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
112. At least one court has stated that a constructive trust cannot be found on
a moral obligation alone. In Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 223 N.Y.S.2d 477,
179 N.E.2d 489 (1961), a husband and wife, both in their second marriage, executed
mutual wills providing for their respective children of previous marriages upon the
death of the survivor. After the husband died, the wife revoked her will and executed
a new one which provided only for her children and which disinherited her step-
children. The court failed to imply a contract not to revoke the original wills. See Com-
ment, Wills - Mutual Wills - Moral Obligation Not Sufficient to Establish Constructive
Trust, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 621 (1961-62).
113. Cramer v. Echelbarger, 142 Ind. App. 374, 377, 234 N.E.2d 864, 866 (1968.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/10
JOINT WILLS CONTRACTS
such a demanding evidentiary standard and the court displays a
very liberal interpretation of what evidence will meet the clear and
convincing standard." ' The facts presented do not create the impres-
sion that the parties intended to enter into an irrevocable contract
to devise."" In holding that there was a contract, the court seriously
usurps the ambulatory characteristic of the will in question."' In a
more recent case, the Court of Appeals continued to show its liberal
interpretation of the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.
In Estate of Maloney v. Carsten,"7 a husband and wife executed
a joint will, with reciprocal provisions, which provided that on the
death of the survivor the property of the estate was to be divided
among relatives of both testators."8 The husband died and the wife
114. The clear and convincing standard is "utilized when . . . the legal and
social ramifications of the civil proceedings are serious." Tucker v. Marion County
Dept. of Public Welfare, - Ind. App. - , - , 408 N.E.2d 814, 820 (1980). In
equating the requirement of clear and convincing evidence, such evidence is a quantum
of proof "which leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact." In re Estate
of Dawson, 103 Ill. App. 2d 362, 371, 243 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1968).
115. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
117. __ Ind. App. - , 381 N.E.2d 2163 (1978).
118. The will stated as follows:
JOINT LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOHN F.
MALONEY AND LENA N. MALONEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE
We, John F. Maloney and Lena N. Maloney, husband and wife, of
Churusbuco, Whitley County, Indiana, desiring to protect each other in
the disposition of our property and desiring to make final disposition
thereof upon the death of the survivor of us, do now make, publish,
acknowledge, and declare this to be our joint last Will and Testament.
Item One
It is our desire and will that the just and legal indebtedness of each
of us shall be paid as soon as possible after our decease by our executor
hereinafter named. At the death of the survivor of us, we give and be-
queath the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) for Masses for
ourselves to Ege Catholic Church, Ege, Indiana.
Item Two
We each give and bequeath unto the survivor of us all personal
property of every description of which we may be possessed or the owner
at the time of our death.
Item Three
The real estate of which we or either of us may die seized or ac-
quire, we give, devise and bequeath unto the survivor of us for and dur-
ing the period of the natural life of such survivor. At this time we are
both of the opinion that it would be to the best interests of the survivor
of us to keep our real estate but on account of illness or from some other
unforesee cause it would be necessary for the comfort, happiness, and
best interest of the survivor to sell our real estate or a portion thereof,
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subsequently executed a new will in which she substantially changed
the testamentary scheme of the original joint will. Upon her death,
suit was filed against her estate. The claim was filed by descendants
of the beneficiaries who were named in the joint will but unmen-
tioned in the subsequent will."9 The claimants alleged that the joint
will was executed pursuant to a contract not to revoke and that ex-
ecution of the second will, which revoked the first, was a breach of
the contract. The claimants asked for a constructive trust to be im-
posed on the property passing by the subsequent will and to give ef-
fect to the testamentary dispositions set forth in the original joint
will. The court concluded that the will itself was sufficient evidence
that the testators had entered into a contract not to revoke and im-
posed a constructive trust on the estate property. 120
The resolution of the contractual issue in Maloney is a poor
one. The court based its decision on weak reasoning and in address-
ing the critical dispute of the existence of a contract, begged the
they may do so.
Item Four
Subject to Items One, Two, and Three, of this our joint last Will
and Testament, we give, devise, and bequeath all our property both real
and personal a one-half share thereof to the relatives of John F. Maloney
hereinafter named; and a one-half share thereof to the relatives of Lena
N. Maloney hereinafter named: that is to say
William C. Maloney brother of John F. Maloney shall receive
50 per cent of said one-half share.
Thereon Grawcock and Oscar Joe Grawcock nephews of the
testator, John F. Maloney, shall receive 25 percent each, of
said undivided one-half share.
Robert Benward and Clarence Benward brothers of the
testatrix, Lena N. Maloney, shall take equal shares of 75 per-
cent of said one-half share.
Mary Ellen McCormick niece of the testatrix, Lena N.
Maloney, shall take 25 percent of said one-half share of said
estate. Should Mary Ellen McCormick die without children
then her share in our estate shall go to Robert Benward and
Clarence Benward in equal shares.
Item Five
On the death of either of us, it is our will that the survivor act as
executor or executrix of our estate. Provided, however, that on the death
of the survivor, it is our desire and request that Churubusco State Bank,
Churubusco, Indiana act as executor of our estate.
In Witness Whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names and
seals, this 13th day of July, 1951.
Id. at __, 381 N.E.2d at 1266.
119. Id. at __, 381 N.E.2d at 1266.
120. Id.
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essential question. 1 ' The opinion stated that not finding an implied
contract from the terms of the will would be inconsistent with the
intention of the testators." However, the initial question was did
the testators intend a contract? The court pointed to no unequivocal
evidence that the testators did intend to enter a binding contract
not to revoke. The factors that the court offered as proof of a con-
tract showed no more than the testators' desire to mutually execute
a joint will.
The preamble of the will stated the intention of the testators
was to "protect" each other and to make "final disposition" of the
property involved. The court concluded that these words were
strong evidence of the parties intent to create a contract.'23 It is evi-
dent that the parties wanted to protect each other by executing the
will, but this intent does not imply an intent to enter into a contract.
The meaning of the word "protect" is unclear.2 ' The court seemed
to think that one party wanted to protect himself from the other
party after death and that this protection would be warranted by
finding an implied contract. 1" An equally logical interpretation is
that the meaning of "protect" referred to protecting the other
testator upon the death of the first. It is very common for a spouse,
when executing a will, to make dispositions which insure that the
survivor will have means by which to live." This is especially true
when one spouse has been primarily responsible for most of the in-
come."2 Further, if the testator's idea of protection meant to protect
himself from the actions of the survivor, that testator may well have
mentioned protecting the third-party beneficiaries as well."8
Arguably, one who is worried about a surviving spouse changing
121. The court appears to assume the matter at issue (testator intent) in its
conclusion when it states: "Any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the inten-
tions of the testators .... Id. at __, 381 N.E.2d at 1267.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The preamble stated:
We, John F. Maloney and Lena M. Maloney, husband and wife, of Churu-
busco, Whitley County, Indiana, desiring to protect each other in the
disposition of our property and desiring to make final disposition thereof
upon the death of the survivor of us, do now . . . declare this to be our
joint last Will and Testament.
Id. at -, 381 N.E.2d at 1266.
125. Id.
126. See generally Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213, 1218 (3d Cir. 1972).
127. Id.
128. There was no mention of third-party beneficiaries in the preamble. See
Estate of Maloney v. Carsten, - Ind. App. , - 381 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (1978).
19831
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provisions in a will, and thinks in terms of protecting himself, would
want to make certain that the beneficiaries to whom he intends his
estate to pass are likewise protected.
The court also placed considerable weight on the words "final
disposition" in the preamble." It felt that if the intent of the parties
was to make a "final disposition," then they must have intended that
disposition to be guarded by a contract."8 This interpretation of the
word "final" is questionable because of the context within which the
word is used. Words like "final," "last," and "ultimate" are very
common in the preamble of wills. These are common words of
devise. It is questionable to hold that executing a "final will" or
"last will" is substantial evidence of a contract that binds the
testator to the terms forever."' The primary feature of a will is its
finality unless or until it is revoked by a subsequent will.'s In
Maloney, the words of the preamble do express the testators' desire
to make a final disposition, but do so in a manner similar to all wills.
The preamble does not show any extraordinary intent to bind the
testators to an irrevocable contract.
The court also gave weight to the testamentary scheme of the
will."a The will provided that upon the death of the survivor the
estate would be divided equally among the family of each testator1 3
This scheme, the court held, was further evidence of an implied con-
tract not to revoke the will. ' s Here again the court might have im-
plied that a moral obligation is the same as a contract, and in doing
so undermined the clear and convincing standard which must be met
to prove a contract.'"
In both Cramer and Maloney the existence of a contract to
devise is unclear. The facts are at best equivocal in proving the in-
129. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
130. The court stated the testators "very clearly and unambiguously stated
that their purpose in executing the joint will was 'to protect each other in the disposi-
tion of our property' and 'to make final disposition thereof upon the death of the sur-
vivor of us.'" Maloney, at __, 381 N.E.2d at 1267.
131. While the most common preamble found in a will asserts merely to be a
"last will," see generally ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS § 147 at 819 (1953), the fact that the
word "final" was used in the preamble, absent other significant contractual writing,
should not be conclusive of a contract in light of the clear and convincing standard.
132. 1 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS § 1.2, at 3 (3d ed. 1960).




136. See supra note 114.
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tent of the testators to enter into an agreement where they bargained
away their ambulatory rights to convey property. It is not hard to
see how the court reached its decisions because in both cases the
facts show that there was a moral reason to bind the testators to
their original wills.187 However, in reaching what may have been the
"right" decision, the court fails to uphold the ambulatory nature of a
will and fails to uphold the substantial burden of the clear and con-
vincing standard. The court, in both cases, began with the premise
that a contract would be implied only if the evidence left nothing to
conjecture."' This is the basic premise of the clear and convincing
standard.'39 But the courts in both cases appear to retreat from the
demands of that standard and base contracts on unclear, ambiguous
evidence and in so doing create questions as to what will or will not
meet the clear and convincing test.
Creating a Stricter Burden of Proof
Soon after the ruling in Maloney, the Court of Appeals was
confronted with two more claims of contracts not to revoke joint
wills. '4 In both cases the court retreated from the liberal interpreta-
tion of the clear and convincing standard it displayed in Maloney
and Cramer. The court demanded much more of a showing that the
testators intended to enter a contract to devise, and in doing so
demonstrated a completely different interpretation of what type of
evidence would meet the clear and convincing standard. The court
failed to acknowledge this change in approach and failed to ade-
quately distinguish the earlier cases. Consequently, the court left
unanswered important questions as to its position on proving
testator intent.
In Moore v. Harvey,"' a husband and wife executed a joint will.
The will left all the property to the survivor of the two, and then
listed a testamentary scheme effective upon the survivor's death."'
137. In Cramer, not finding a contract would have meant a third party receiv-
ing in fee simple a farm which was owned by another family for over one hundred
twenty-five years. In Maloney, not finding a contract would have meant the surviving
wife would have had the power to disinherit her husband's blood relatives after he
died.
138. Cramer v. Echelbarger, 142 Ind. App. 374, 377, 234 N.E.2d 864, 866 (1968);
Estate of Maloney v. Carsten, - Ind. App. - -, 381 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (1978).
139. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
140. Moore v. Harvey, - Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 354 (1980); Wisler v.
McCormack, - Ind. App. , 406 N.E.2d 361 (1980).
141. - Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 354 (1980).
142. Id. at -, 406 N.E.2d at 356.
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Two particular parcels of land were specifically devised, one to their
son and one to their daughter."" Thirteen years after the husband
died the wife was diagnosed as having terminal cancer of the lung.
She was forced to have constant medical care and went to live with
her daughter. Several days before she died, the wife conveyed both
parcels of land, the one intended for her daughter plus the one in-
tended for her son, to her daughter by deed.144 The son, upon learn-
ing of this conveyance, brought an action against his mother's estate
claiming the original joint will was executed pursuant to an irrevoc-
able contract and that the act of conveying the property inter vivos
contravened that contract.' 5
The preamble of the will in Moore stated:
We, Landis M. Moore and Carrie M. Moore, husband and
wife, of Hamilton County, Indiana, having mutually agreed
to make the devises and bequests hereinafter set out, and
in consideration of the testamentary disposition of our
property hereinafter made, hereby make, declare and
publish this our joint will.'"
The remainder of the will left the property in fee simple to the sur-
vivor and then upon the death of the survivor the will contained
provisions disposing of all of the assets owned by the survivor."'
The court held that this evidence was not enough to meet the clear
and convincing standard and failed to establish an implied contract




145. Id. at __, 406 N.E.2d at 357.
146. Id.
147. Id. at -, 406 N.E.2d at 358.
148. The court stated:
The only evidence offered by Moore at trial on the issue of an agreement
of irrevocability was the will itself .... Hence, there was nothing other
than the preamble for the trial court to consider in determining whether
Carrie and Landis intended to bind each other to the terms of their joint
will. The trial court determined Moore failed in his burden of establishing
a contract of irrevocability. An examination of the preamble compels our
agreement with the trial court's determination that the language in the
preamble of the will is insufficient to establish an express or implied con-
tract of irrevocability. The language in the preamble expresses a present
agreement to effect a certain disposition after their deaths but does not
expressly state an agreement that the presently agreed disposition is
forever binding. Thus, the trial court correctly determined the preamble
was not an express contract of irrevocability.
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The decision in Moore not to imply a contract appears to be a
correct evaluation of the evidence presented against the rigorous
demands of the clear and convincing standard. However, the deci-
sion is suspect in light of the earlier approach taken by the court in
Cramer and Maloney. In Maloney, the court stated that the correct
construction of a will is that which is consistent with the intent of
the testator as it appears in the will. " 9 Further, the court in
Maloney gave great weight to the preamble which stated the pur-
pose of the testators executing a joint will. In Moore, the testators
executed a will which provided for specific bequests to both the son
and daughter. By upholding the inter vivos transfer, the court does
not give full effect to the intentions of both testators, which was to
provide for both children. Further, the preamble states that the
testator's "mutually agreed" to the bequests therein and in "con-
sideration of the testamentary dispositions" published their joint
will." This language is clearly language of contract. The court does
not give adequate treatment to these factors.
The facts in Moore were very uncertain on the issue of
whether the testators entered into a contract not to revoke. How-
ever, in light of the earlier Maloney decision where the court
displayed a liberal interpretation of what evidence would meet the
clear and convincing standard, Moore creates uncertainty as to
when the court will be convinced of a contract. Perhaps the Moore
court thought the Maloney decision was a poor one. If this was so,
then the Moore decision was the place to voice that criticism. One
month later, in another implied contract claim, the Court of Appeals
tried to set some definite standards in this area, but still did not
adequately explain the shift in interpretation of the clear and con-
vincing standard.
In Wisler v. McCormack,"' a husband and wife executed a joint
will with reciprocal provisions. The will provided that on the death
of the surviving testator all of the property would transfer in equal
shares to the testators' nieces and nephews. 62 The key difference
149. Estate of Maloney v. Carsten, - Ind. App. -, _, 381 N.E.2d 1263
at 1267 (1978), citing Brown v. Union Trust Co. of Greensburg, 229 Ind. 404, 98 N.E.2d
901 (1951).
150. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151. __ Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 361 (1980).
152. The will provided:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, Clayton E. Weis and Bertha S. Weis, husband and wife, of St.
Joseph County, Indiana, both being of sound mind and memory, do make,
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between the joint will in Maloney and the one in Wisler was a provi-
sion in the latter will which gave a certain parcel of land and some
money owned by the husband to named third parties outside the
family." After the husband died the wife executed a new will which
disposed of her property in a substantially different manner than
the joint will. Upon her death, a claim against her estate was filed
by a residuary devisee under the joint will. The claimant alleged
that the joint will embodied a contract not to revoke its provisions.
He relied on the court's ruling in Maloney'" to claim that he was en-
titled to a portion of the estate."
The Wisler case presented facts very similar to the Maloney
case." However, the court failed to find a contract. The court dis-
publish and declare this instrument to be jointly as well as severally, our
last will and testament, hereby revoking all former wills.
1. We direct that all just debts and funeral expenses shall
at all times be fully paid and the erection of monument and
markers.
2. Upon the decease of the said Clayton E. Weis, we give
and devise all of the property owned by the said Clayton E.
Weis in the South East Quarter (1/4) of the South East Quar-
ter (1/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28), Township Thirty-seven
(37) North, Range Three (3) East, in St. Joseph County, In-
diana; unto Carl M. Fulmer.
3. Upon the decease of the said Clayton E. Weis, we give
and bequeath unto the Coalbush Evangelical United Breth-
ren Church of Penn Township, St. Joseph County, Indiana,
the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars.
4. We give, bequeath, and devise all of the rest and residue
of our property, real as well as personal, of which we may be
possessed or entitled to dispose of at the time of the decease
of either of us, to the survivor.
5. Upon the decease of the survivor of us, we give, be-
queath. and devise all of the property of such survivor, real
as well as personal, to the nephews and nieces of each of us,
to be shared by them as tenants in common, share and share
alike.
6. We nominate and appoint the said Carl M. Fulmer to act
as executor of this, our last will and testament.
In witness whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names this - day
of June, 1947.
Id. at __, 406 N.E.2d at 362-63.
153. See supra note 152 provisions #2 and #3.
154. Maloney v. Carsten, __ Ind. App. , 381 N.E.2d 1263 (1978).
155. In holding that Maloney was not applicable, the court stated: "Maloney,
relied upon by the claimant is inapposite. . . . In the instant case no comparable
language can be found." Wisler v. McCormack at __, 406 N.E.2d 364, n.2.
156. In both cases a husband and wife had executed joint wills with no express
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regarded the path of reasoning used in the Maloney decision and in-
stead cited an Illinois case as persuasive authority.157 This Illinois
case set out guidelines compiled from a study of opinions which had
analyzed various implied contract allegations in various cases."M
These guidelines were much stricter than the guidelines used by the
court in Maloney. The court held that the necessities for finding an
implied contract were the mutuality of promises or reciprocal con-
siderations, the intent of the testators to merge both estates into
one corpus, a limitation on the use of the property by the survivor,
and an actual agreement not to revoke, or evidence showing such an
agreement.5 9
In Maloney, the evidence that led the court to find a contract
was the language of finality in the preamble and the dividing of the
total estate in equal shares to relatives.6 0 Evidence of both of these
factors was present in Wisler, but the court did not find it per-
suasive."' Instead, the court, in making its decision, noted that the
will did not contain a specific recital that was contractual."' Although
the will did employ plural pronouns, the court ruled that these pro-
nouns by themselves amounted to nothing more than the natural
usage of language by two testators executing their wills in one docu-
ment. "
The court in Wisler paid particular attention to the provisions
in the will which devised land and some money to named third par-
contract or reference to a contract. In both cases the husband died and wife subse-
quently executed a new will which substantially changed the provisions of the original
joint will. In Maloney, the joint will provided for all of the estate to be divided equally
among both testators' relatives. In Wisler, the joint will provided for most of the
estate property to be divided equally among the testators' nieces and nephews.
157. See Wisler v. McCormack at -, 406 N.E.2d at 363-64, citing Estate of
Mueller, 26 Ill. App. 3d 163, 324 N.E.2d 674 (1975).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
161. The preamble stated:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, Clayton E. Weis and Bertha S. Weis, husband and wife, of St.
Joseph County, Indiana, both being of sound mind and memory, do make,
publish and declare this instrument to be jointly we well as severally, our
last will and testament, hereby revoking all former wills.
Wisler v. McCormack, - Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 361, 362 (1980).
162. Id. at __, 406 N.E.2d at 364.
163. The court cited Reynods v. Park, - Tex. Cir. App. -, 521 S.W.2d 300
(1975), to support the finding that the contract claim failed in part because there was
no specific contractual recital. Wisler v. McCormack, __ Ind. App. 406
N.E.2d 361, 364 (1980).
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ties on the death of the husband.'" The court held that these provi-
sions showed there was no joinder of property into one corpus, and
that the intent of the testators was to separately execute their wills
by one instrument. This reasoning is suspect. The wording of these
provisions contained similar plural pronouns to those used in the re-
maining distributions."5 Therefore, in all of the devises, both parties
were executing control over each disposition. It is arguable then
that there was joinder of all the assets because both testators jointly
controlled each disposition. In any event, there was definitely
joinder of assets of all of the property of both testators, except for
the specific land and money, pursuant to bequest number four."'
The result in Wisler, of not finding an implied contract, seems
appropriate. The specific facts presented did not present clear and
convincing evidence of an irrevocable contract. However, the credi-
bility of the decision in light of the previous Maloney holding is
weak. Wisler's weakness lies in the court's analysis and handling of
its earlier decision in Maloney. The court attempted to distinguish
the cases and in dosing so created more confusion than clarity.
The facts of Maloney and Wisler are so similar that one would
have expected the court to resolve the cases with the same reason-
ing and holding. Instead, the Wisler court tried to distinguish its
earlier finding in Maloney by comparing the language of the two
wills. 1' In a footnote to the opinion, the court stated that there was
no comparable language in the Wisler preamble to the words "pro-
tect" and "final" found in the Maloney preamble.'68 Although there
were no words to this effect, this is not enough to justify the dif-
ferent holdings of the cases. The cases can only be distinguished on
the basis that the court was holding an implied contract claim to a
new, stricter application of the clear and convincing standard. The
164. See supra note 152.
165. Id.
166. The fourth bequest stated that all the remaining property of either dece-
dent would pass to the survivor. The fifth bequest then stated that relatives from both
testators' family would share all of this property equally upon the death of the sur-
vivor. Wisler v. McCormack, - Ind. App. , - 406 N.E.2d 361, 362-63 (1980).
This appears to be the joinder of property into one corpus the Wisler court said was
necessary to imply a contract. Notwithstanding the two specific devises, it can be
argued the rest of the estate was subject to the constraint of a contract pursuant to
the Maloney decision.
167. Wisler v. McCormack, __ Ind. App. 406 N.E.2d 361, 364 n.2
(1980).
168. Id.
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court in Wisler was changing the approach taken in Maloney, thus
rendering its continued validity questionable.
Maloney and Wisler epitomize two completely different ap-
proaches to solving the same problem. Unfortunately, this is difficult
to understand since both decisions came from one court, 9 and the
latter did not claim to criticize the former. In Maloney the court ap-
peared willing to infer the existence of a contract from a minimum
of evidence.' It also appeared willing to determine the testator's in-
tent from the use of a few ambiguous words in the will's preamble. 7'
In Wisler, the court took a stricter approach to resolving the ques-
tion of testator intent by listing very specific guidelines which
should be followed. These include the actual recital of a contractual
arrangement.'72 In Maloney, the court appeared to take the position
that it could infer from a few commonly used words what the testa-
tors intended. 7' In Wisler, the same court demanded that if the
testators intended to form a contract they must have expressly
stated that intent. There is no consistency between these two case
resolutions. Further, there are no reasonable grounds upon which to
distinguish the approaches taken by the court.'
169. Both Maloney and Wisler were appeals to the Court of Appeals of In-
diana, Third District. In Maloney, Judge Staton wrote the opinion, Judge Hoffman and
Judge Chipman (by designation) concurred. In Wisler, Judge Hoffman wrote the opin-
ion, Judge Garrard concurred, and Judge Staton concurred in the result.
170. See supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
172. Wisler v. McCormack, __ Ind. App -... 406 N.E.2d 361, 363
(1980).
173. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
174. One may question the inconsistencies apparent between Moore and
Wisler. Both of these cases establish the strict approach to interpreting joint wills.
However, Moore only cites Indiana precedent in establishing the strict standard.
Moore cites Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E.2d 568 (1945), which held
that an implied contract can only be found when the evidence is "clear, definite, une-
quivocal, and satisfactory." Id. at 490, 59 N.E.2d at 570. The Moore court then deter-
mined that the will did not warrant finding an implied contract, and suggested that the
claimant should have offered more evidence in the way of witnesses who knew the
facts, admissions of the parties, acts and conduct of the parties, and other cir-
cumstances surrounding the execution of the will. Moore v. Harvey, __ Ind. App.
- - 406 N.E.2d 354, 358 (1980).
In Wisler, the court also cited Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E.2d
568 (1945), to establish the evidentiary standard. However, Wisler went one step fur-
ther and cited as persuasive authority out-of-state cases which discussed guidelines to
follow in applying the strict "clear and convincing" standard. See supra notes 157 and
163 and accompanying text. The Wisler court then applied these out-of-state guidelines
as requisites to finding an implied contract in Indiana. While both Moore and Wisler
work to establish a strict evidentiary approach, Wisler substantiates its decision with
case law while Moore offers none.
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REFLECTIONS ON THE INCONSISTENCIES
It is argued that determining whether testators intended to
enter into an irrevocable contract when executing a joint or mutual
will is an area of the law particularly suited for free decision and
lack of standardized treatment.' This argument is based on the fact
that there are countless sets of different facts surrounding each con-
tract claim and also because the court may use concepts of fair-
ness 178 as a motivator beyond the basic law of wills and contracts.
But this argument loses its validity when resolutions of similar
issues are so different and so inconsistent that general guidelines
are not predictable or ascertainable. Although a case-by-case analy-
sis is necessary because the facts of each estate will differ, the court
cannot "afford to stultify itself through erratic and inarticulate deci-
sions." '77 If a contract is to be the basis for enforcing a joint will and
the contract depends for its proof on pure form, then there is no
room for consideration of the fairness of the dispositive scheme. 7 '
The ultimate and only question that must be answered is whether
the evidence shows an intent of the parties to enter forever into a
binding contract. 7 1 The problem with an ad hoc method of resolution
is that no one can be sure, before the court actually submits its opin-
ion, what facts and evidence will or will not be persuasive of a con-
tract. A theory used in one case to do justice may not be employed
in other cases because the court feels differently about how justice
can be served. "The price of perfect flexibility is that no case serves
as a guide for the next."'"
Since the applicable law in most implied contract claims is con-
trolled by precedent, the resolutions of prior cases are important to
all parties involved in similar subsequent claims."8 ' Trial courts need
to be able to look to past resolutions of similar issues to be sure that
the decision they will render is consistent with the law in the
state." The trial court needs to show that the treatment a case has
received is the same treatment the case would receive in a higher
175. See Young, supra note 11, at 440.
176. Id. See also Eagleton, supra note 5, at 379.
177. Young, supra note 11, at 440.
178. Id. at 447. Professor Eagleton has stated that "considerations of fairness"
may exert a conscious or unconscious influence on the court. Eagleton, supra note 5, at
379; see also Young, supra note 11, at 448-51.
179. Cramer v. Echelbarger, 142 Ind. App. 374, 377, 234 N.E.2d 864, 866 (1968).
180. Young, supra note 11, at 449.
181. Id.
182. The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is
reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process described by the
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/10
JOINT WILLS CONTRACTS
court. Attorneys and parties to lawsuits also look at past cases for
some degree of predictability when deciding whether to proceed in
an original claim or appeal from an unfavorable judgment. The more
cases that are clearly and consistently decided on the lower court
level, the less chance that the same case will have to be reviewed.
The four recent Indiana cases discussed are not serving collec-
tively as a guide to subsequent contract claims. The Court of Ap-
peals has invited excess litigation by representing two inconsistent
resolutions to the same issue. A third party beneficiary who thinks
he may have been defrauded would be foolish not to bring a claim
based on an implied contract in a joint or mutual will which is silent
to a contractual undertaking. Claimants of an alleged contract will
ask the court to take a liberal approach and rely on Maloney and
Cramer.'88 Opponents of the contract will assume the strict approach
of Moore and Wisler.'"
This is not to say that in those cases where the Court of Ap-
peals found a contract there was no evidence which would lead to
such a holding. There were specific words and implications which
when looked at in the most favorable light may have suggested the
chance that the testators entered into a contract.'85 However, in
light of the substantial burden which must be met to sustain the
clear and convincing standard, the evidence presented simply leaves
too much in doubt to clearly establish a contract. The court cannot
imply an agreement based on the execution of a joint or mutual will
where the circumstances are inconclusive and permit an inference
either way."
It is important to note that the Court of Appeals in the Wis-
Ier'87 decision held the clear and convincing standard to the high
doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of the first case
is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation.
The steps are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law
inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made ap-
plicable to the second case. This is a method of reasoning necessary for
the law, but it has characteristics which under other circumstances might
be considered imperfections.
E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949).
183. __ Ind. App. -, 381 N.E.2d 1263 (1978).
184. Wisler v. McCormack, - Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 361 (1980); Moore
v. Harvey, - Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 354 (1980).
185. See supra notes 105-139 and accompanying text.
186. See Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, - , 136 N.W.2d 208, 212-13 (1965)
(McCown concurring).
187. - Ind. App. -, 406 N.E.2d 361 (1980).
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burden it purports to establish."' Further, in that same decision the
court may have adopted some definite standards from out-of-state
cases by which to determine testator intent. 89 The problem still re-
mains, however, that each set of facts will consistently be different
from the last and the determination of an oral or implied contract
based on evidence other than a written contract is bound to create
confusion. Only when the clear and convincing standard is applied
with the utmost rigor, and this may mean finding a contract only
when one is clearly and expressly written in or along with a will,
can that standard be useful in this area.
The Indiana court must make sure they adequately distinguish
between the law of wills and the law of contracts. In Cramer and
Maloney, where the evidence was not clear that the testators con-
tracted not to revoke their wills, holding the opposite severely
undermined basic contractual theory as well as the ambulatory
characteristic of a will. It is ironic that when the court has the writ-
ten will in front of it and only an inference of a contractual under-
taking, many times the court's holding turns the will into a contract
and obviates the revocable nature of the tangible instrument.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In an area as important as the disposition of deceased persons'
estates, there must be assurance that a court-ordered disposition is
in the manner in which the deceased intended prior to his death.
The court cannot go farther than the will itself provides, nor can the
court rewrite the will. In a claim of an oral or implied contract not
to revoke a joint or mutual will, the will itself must be the starting
point for the decision of whether such a contract does in fact exist.
If there is no unequivocal proof that the testators did mutually
agree and contract to make their testamentary schemes irrevocable,
then the wills should not be held to any contractual restraints.
From the estate planner's point of view, the problems inherent
in joint or mutual wills can be avoided by simple awareness of the
possible problems involved. 9 ' The most obvious solution to inconsist-
ent decisions based on different sets of facts applied to an am-
biguous evidentiary standard is to expressly state or negate the ex-
istence of a contract in clear terms. If joint or mutual wills are ex-
188. See supra note 114.
189. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
190. Note, Recent Developments of the Iowa Law of Joint and Mutual Wills,
44 IOWA L. REV. 523, 541 (1959).
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ecuted and the testators desire a contract not to revoke, an express
document embodying all of the terms should be prepared and refer-
red to or embodied in the wills. 9' If a contract is not intended, then
a provision negating any contractual undertaking should be in-
cluded. 92
The courts should also focus on the attorney when deciding
whether a specific will was executed pursuant to a contract not to
revoke. One should assume that the attorney initiated and discussed
the possibility and consequences of a contract with the execution of
a joint or mutual will. This is an assumption the court must make if
it does indeed find a contract. If there was an agreement between
the parties to enter a contract, it seems reasonable to assume that
the attorney would make sure that the contract and its terms were
specifically stated. A capable attorney would not leave to conjecture
what could easily be expressed in clear and definite terms.193 Thus,
the absence of an express written contract should infer the non-
existence of an irrevocable contract.
The Indiana courts must fulfill their responsibility to the legal
system and clear up the confusion they have created in ascertaining
testators' intent to contract when executing a joint or mutual will.
There are two paths to alleviate the problems the courts have
created. Neither solution presents major insurmountable difficulties.
The first step the court should take is to discuss the obvious
differences in the resolution of the recent cases. The most recent
cases show that the court will apply a very strict evidentiary stand-
ard to a claim of an implied contract not to revoke a joint will. In
the background, however, the liberal application of the evidentiary
standard in Maloney still looms as valid law. The Maloney decision
appears to be a "catch all" case which may be cited as precedent for
any finding of a contract in a joint will claim. With Maloney as valid
precedent, the court need only point to specific words, used in the
text of the will itself, which the court thinks are evidence of a con-
tractual arrangement between the testators.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. In Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, -, 223 N.Y.S.2d 477, -, 179
N.E.2d 489, 492 (1981), the court addressed the attorney's role in the execution of
mutual wills. Referring to the absence of a express writing of a contract the court said:
"[I]t is remarkable that it [contract] was not put in writing ... by so experienced and
competent a lawyer as Mr. Ernst." Id. In addressing the testimony of the attorney who
prepared the will, the court found it conclusive that he did not testify that the parties
intended an irrevocable contract along with the will. Id.
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The latest resolutions to implied contract claims assert and de-
mand that only unequivocal evidence of testators' intent to enter a
binding contract will prove an underlying bargain. However, it is
not enough to assume that the liberal Maloney decision has been
overruled sub silento. The Court of Appeals recognized Maloney as
valid law in both subsequent cases and then struggled to evade its
earlier finding. The court must clearly and unequivocally state that
it was wrong in Maloney or once and for all state whether the
liberal or strict application of "clear and convincing" is the standard
by which to resolve implied contract claims. The finding of a con-
tract based on mere "word-choice" would be in complete disregard
of the approach taken by the courts in most recent cases.
The ultimate resolution to this problem may rest with the state
legislature. If the courts do not resolve the issue, then the
legislature should adopt the written requirement of the Uniform
Probate Code,'" or some other written requirement. The courts
have missed two opportunities to definitively state the desired
method of resolving implied contract claims. Therefore, the state
legislature should intervene because the court has refused to act.
Time is of the essence. Unless some definite steps are taken by the
legislature or the courts, inconsistent judicial decisions will certainly
continue.
Frank A. Lattal
194. See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
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